Strategy Flawed

The old strategy has been repackaged and it is just as unlikely to succeed. Worse, it demonstrates that this Administration still doesn’t understand the conflict in which it is engaged. In an op-ed piece in the Las Vegas Sun published 18 October 2001 I noted the necessity to define the war. To this date, the opposition defines the parameters of the conflict and the US responds. That is a fundamentally flawed policy.

LAS VEGAS (STARpod.org) -- At the heart of the matter is that the conflict is not about Iraq, or any other territory for that matter. Still, we cling tenaciously to the anachronistic concept of wars based on geographic boundaries. The ongoing struggle is about religion and irreconcilable competing belief systems. It did not start with Saddam or when the US led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, rather the genesis dates back thirteen hundred years. The impetus for this strife was exacerbated over a century ago when the Europeans divided up the Middle East at the end of the Ottoman Empire. The prime concern for establishing borders was interests of the European countries, not those of the inhabitants of the area.

As in many other areas of the world, primary allegiances in the Middle East are based on family and tribal relationships, not nationalism. The imposed boundaries are near meaningless to the local inhabitants. Yet, we continue to attempt to impose Western solutions on intransigent problems. President Bush stated in his 10 January address to the nation, “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people – and it is unacceptable to me.” How arrogant, since he is largely responsible for those conditions. Colin Powell, among many others, warned of the dangers of invading Iraq and the responsibilities that we would assume in so doing. Powell was ignored. General Eric Shinseki, then-Chief of Staff of the Army, told Congress that the force structure dictated by Donald Rumsfeld was far too small. For that he was sidelined. Instead of accepting the sage council of those experienced in Middle East affairs and military leaders, President Bush followed the advice of neoconservative ideologues who believed the US would be greeted as great liberators. According to their fallacious thinking, in short order a self-sustaining government would be functioning and reconstruction paid for by Iraq’s petroleum industry. Instead, there have been the deaths of tens of thousands of people, including over three thousand US military personnel, and expenditure of hundreds of billions of US taxpayer dollars with very little to show for it.

Now President Bush claims with just a few thousand more US troops to support Iraqi forces we can secure Baghdad in a few months leading to a stable democracy. Then, it is conceptualized, Iraq will become a beacon for the entire area. As rationale for this venture, he resorted to the old threat that if we do not have control of Iraq, “Our enemies will have a safe haven from which to launch attacks on the American people.” In fact, when no weapons of mass destruction were found, the connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was used as post hoc justification for the invasion. No such evidence was forthcoming. We are again warned that, “Radical Islamist extremists would grow in strength and gain ‘new recruits.’” That is certainly true and will occur with or without additional troops in Iraq. Our prior actions and arrogance have guaranteed generations of such recruits.

The Administration seems to be oblivious to a concept of strategy. What have been proposed are minor changes in tactics, not a strategy. Many analysts rightfully fear that we have destabilized the entire region and that the conflict will spread. Our actions have virtually assured that outcome. Even the tactics of sending additional troops runs counter to the advice of most senior military commanders and the desires of the Iraqi people. It will result in more casualties for all.

What is needed most urgently is a comprehensive strategy that addresses the geopolitical realities of the entire region. We must understand complex demographics and social structures of the area that do not conform to Western secular ideals. Insured energy availability will continue to act as a counterbalancing force in a primarily ideological conflict.

The bottom line is that we have failed to define the conflict. Our military forces have done all that has been asked of them and more. Yet, despite ubiquitous platitudes from politicians and conservative talk show hosts, no one has satisfactorily described what constitutes winning. Based on centuries of historical precedence, the probability that commitment of an additional twenty thousand troops will lead to stability in Iraq in a few months is vanishingly small. The question for each lawmaker should be, “Would I send my son or daughter to this surge in Iraq?”

John Alexander is a retired Army officer and senior fellow with two DOD universities. He lives in Las Vegas.

Reproduced by permission of the author.